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SPINOZA AND IMMORTALITY
BY ERNEST G. BRAHAM
ON first consideration one would not expect Spinoza to have
any place for immortality in his teaching seeing that he
considers that there is One Spiritual Substance in existence with its
tem]:)orary differentiations into things and persons. One needs
to observe, however, that throughout Spinoza's system there runs
two fundamental views which are never cjuite reconciled. The first
em]>hasizes the unitv of the universe at the expense of the parts, the
second side is quite individualistic, emphasizing the parts at the
expense of the unity. This latter side comes out especially in what
he terms the "conatus" which plays a prominent part in his ethical
teaching. According to this the differentiations of the imiverse
have a tendency to seek their own preservation as against the efforts
of the other parts, and he makes this ''conatus" the essence of the
individual.
\\'h-en. however, Spinoza is arguing against Descartes he takes
rather the other view based on the unity of Reality. Descartes
said that there were two kinds of substance, matter and mind, but
he did not regard these as having equal value. As regards matter,
there is only one material substance, viz., the whole material uni-
verse : what we call a chair or a house or any particular part of the
material universe is only a temporary modification of the one ma-
terial sriistance for Descartes and as such will come to an end. But
Descartes treats spiritual substance quite differently. He does not
consider that there is only one Spiritual Substance but that each
individual mind is a genuine substance. Admittedly he thinks that
each spiritual substance is something that depends for its existence
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upon God but eacli spiritual substance will last forever unless God
annihilates it.
Spinoza wages war against the idea of the two kinds of sub-
stance in Descart-es, material and spiritual and asserts that there is
only one Spiritual Substance and that our minds are just temporary
modes of that one substance. Instead of saying with Descartes that
God had created material substance and a lot of other spiritual
substances. .Spinoza says God alone is Substance known to us under
the form of two attributes (although having infinite attributes)
these two attributes being extension and thought, that is material
form and menial form. The attributes, however, about which
Spinoza s]«2aks are almost at times exalted by him to the level of
substance. In any case they cannot be degraded to mere qualities of
the one sul)stance. They seem to have a rank not (|uite so high
as Sul)stance and not (|uite so low as form or quality. Each of the
Attributes, extension and tliought, is differentiated into modes. On
the side of our bodies we are modes of the attribute of extension,
on the side of our minds w-e are modes of the attribute of thought.
There is for Spinoza complete correlation between the two modes
bodv and mind, we cannot have liody without mind, nor mind
w ithout body.
Farther, Si:)inoza begins to draw a distinction between finite
and infinite modes, and the infinite modes turn out to be the eternal
differentiations of the attributes. Given a man as he really is he
must be regardefl as an eternal mode of the attribute of thought on
the side of his mind, and an eternal mode of the attribute of ex-
tension on the side of his body. This position i^resents us with
the r^al difiiculty of reconciling the fact that man's bodv which
breaks u]) like any other finite bod)- in death, being necessarilv
correlated to his spirit, would involve on a strict logical interpretation
tliat tiian's si)irit would break up too.
More difficulties arise in regard t" the (|uesti()ii of the iiiimortalitv
of the soul in .Spinoza's theory of knowledge. In this he dis-
tinguishes between thrc-e kinds of knowledge (a) the knowledge
which comes through the senses (h) rational or scientific knowledge
(c I inti'iiivc knowledge.
(a) This type is full of error. 'I'he knowledge ihrough the
senses depends upon the action of things iijx*!! the body and in con-
sequence it frefpiently tells us more about our own bodv than of
the external things. .Again the coniu'ction i> only an association be-
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tween the diflerent parts of this knowledge, there is no real logical
connection. C'onnected with this first type of knowledge there are
the passions on the conative side. The essence of knowledge at this
stage is that the individual is more acted upon than acting, both as
regards knowledge, emotions and conations.
(b) In regard to the second type of knowledge,— rational or
scientific knowledge,—this is a much clearer type. It is a knowl-
edge that depends on "notiones communes" as he calls them.
There are certain facts common to all kinds of bodies including our
own, such as geometrical and mechanical properties. If we confine
ourselves strictly to these we shall not fall into the mistake of con-
fusing vv'hat is due to our own body and what is due to the .external
world. Again at this stage one is not dealing with mere association
but with real logical connection between ideas. Probably Spinoza
would include more than we should in what is called logical con-
nection because at his period thinkers regarded causation as logical
sequence. If B always followed A, then A was thought of as the
cause of T'.. Also under the heading of logical connection he would
include what we call laws of nature. The connections then in this
second type of knowledge which he calls scientific knowledge are
real logical connections and not mere association as in the first type
knowledge which comes through the senses. Yet on-e cannot claim,
according to Spinoza, that this second type of knowledge in entirely
satisfactory because as he would sav it is all about generalities.
Corresponding to it there is a rational understanding of our own
passions, and for the causes of it a psychological understanding is
required, but owing to the abstractness of this knowledge it does
not hel]) us to control by our minds. Spinoza's own view is that one
passion can be controlled by another if you can replace passive
emotions by active ones, which are those in which we have clear
understanding. For instance, sorrow, a passive emotion does not
do good either to the sorrowful person or to others. Spinoza would
say that v/e should not merely try to get rid of sorrow, but try to
understand the real causes of personal trouble and disaster and the
troubles and disasters which overtake others, and base then upon
that active emotion adesive to help. So much for the second type of
knowledge.
(c) The third type, intuitive knowledge, is supposed to combine
the merits of the concreteness of the first with the merits of the sec-
ond. The second is clear and rational knowledge and so is the third
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type, but the latter is not confin-ed to abstractions and o^eneralities.
Spinoza being- a mystic, it is difficult to know what he reallv means
bv scictitin intiiit'z'a. Probably it is a mystical knowledg^e or insight
which comes only to those who have mystical experiences. He
saw the system of the universe as a whole, which ordinary science
cnily sees piecemeal but his view seems essentially to be that the
content of the second and third type of knowledge is the same
with tliis distinction of outlook, viz.. that in the stage of scientific
knowledge one's mind moves from one piece of the world to another.
but in intuitive knowledge one passes to the whole immediately.
Tt is the same system, however, which the mystic sees as a whole
that the scientist sees fragmentarily as he considers one portion of
reality after another. But there is another point in Spinoza's allied
to this special mystical knowledge and indeed its most essential ele-
ment which is that special tvpe of emotion which he called "the
intellectual love of God."
From this theor\' of knowledge the Spinozian view of immor-
tality must be developed. Indeed it certainly cannot he grasped un-
less his theory of knowledge is first understood. One is quite aware
that difficulties arise out of his theory of knowledge especially over
the fact of error. According to Spinoza error arises because we
have finite bodi-es, each of us has a special place in the world and
consequently we see things from a special angle and so we are liable
to group things together which are not closely connected in nature
and also to separate things which are closely related in nature. This
of course \vorks all right so long as we regard ourselves as being
finite modes, but in the later stages of knowledge he makes out that
we (our bodies and minds) are not finite modes but eternal diiTeren-
tiations of God, that is infinite modes. The way Spinoza tries to
reconcile this apparent dualism is ingenious. He says that each man,
as he really is, is an infinite differentiation of reality, but most men
are mistaken as to the nature of their true selves. \Miat the ordi-
nary man takes for his true self is not an infinite and eternal
diff-erentiation, it is a mix up of bits from one infinite mode and
bits from other infinite modes. To this man death will mean finding
out the mistake. X(^ doubt cxcryonc is more or less mistaken about
the true self, but the ordinary man who lives entirely on the level
of perceptual knowledge and passive emotion is tremendously mis
taken al)oiit ll)c nature of his true self. Take the a\erage book-
maker for instance. Xo doubt there is an eternal dilTerentiation of
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reality corres])ondin,^ to him, l)ut as he knows himself it does not
nniqnely correspond to him. What he calls himself, and what he
lakes an interest in is a mix up of parts extracted from a great
numher of eternal modes. When he dies the eternal modes will go
on all right, hut the peculiar mixture which he calls himself will come
to an end, consequently this type of man is mortal. In the case
of the wise man, however, such men as Plato or Spinoza himself.
vSpinoza would say no douht what the wise men take to be themselves
contains some confusion. That is to say there is not one eternal
single differentiation which corresponds to the wise man. Still he
has got over so many delusions by rising to the second and third
tvpes of knowledge that what he knows as himself is inainlv one
eternal difi"erentiation though there ma}' be slight elements from the
eternal modes mixed with it in the wise man's views of himself.
When this kind of man dies the mixture will cease but tJic bulk
of what he takes to be himself now is really an eternal mode, there-
fore in that sense he is immortal.
This seems to be what S]:>inoza means by immortality. Tt is
clearly only the immortality of the wise.
In closing one may add two brief criticisms.
(a) How in the first place do these mixtures of eternal differen-
tiations arise? If one says that the bookmaker mistakes a mixture
for himself and that this mixture will not last the shock of death,
surely there must be some reason why this or any of the particular
mixture exists here and now. One cannot see why infinite and
eternal modes should be mistaken about their own limits. We have
here in Spinoza the same sort of difficulty as that of reconciling the
infinite with finite modes.
(b) On Spinoza's y'xqw there is complete correlation between
the thought and the extension sides of any mode. The body of the
wise man breaks up in death just in exactly the same way as the
body of ordinary man, and yet Spinoza appears to hold that the
mind of the wise man persists with very little change whilst the
mind of the man on the lower level is such a mixture and confusion
that it disappears in death and that as mind it ceases to be.
These are some of the questions arising out of Spinoza's view
of immortality, which as we have seen, arises out of his theory of
knowledge. Spinoza gives no convincing proof why the wise men
alone should be immortal. The proof he gives is inconsistent with
his metaphysical basis of the One Substance : and the ordinary
532 THE OPEN COURT
man asks why this Lltimate ReaHty of which he is a part, which
produced him, and to which he contributes in his moral endeavour,
should reduce him to a cipher at the end of his earthly course ? This
question demands a more satisfactory answer than Spinoza ofifers us.
